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REGULATING INTRASTATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Introduction
The. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
strengthened the power of state public utility commissions to regulate
intrastate telecommunications services in its recent decision, California v.
FCC.' In this decision, the court invalidated the Federal Communica-
tions Commission's (FCC's) Computer III Order, 2 a regulatory scheme
that changed the way that the FCC would regulate "enhanced services,"
a computerized form of telecommunications service that allows elec-
tronic information to be modified, as well as transmitted.3 More impor-
tantly, the court held that the FCC may not preempt state regulators
from regulating purely intrastate enhanced services.
The Computer III Order, issued in 1986, was the FCC's third effort
in twenty years to regulate the use of computers by the telecommunica-
tions industry. The FCC issued the Computer III Order just three weeks
after the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Louisiana
Public Service Commission v. FCC.4 This decision limited the FCC's au-
thority under the Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act or
Act) to preempt state action.5 Under the Communications Act, the FCC
and the states share regulatory jurisdiction over the telecommunications
industry. Sections 152(a) and (b) of the Communications Act establish a
dual regulatory structure under which the FCC may regulate interstate
telecommunications, while the states have jurisdiction over intrastate
telecommunications. In Louisiana Public Service, the Supreme Court
strictly interpreted these sections of the Communications Act to protect
the states' authority to regulate intrastate services.6
The Computer III Order eliminated proven regulatory controls over
enhanced services and preempted the states from regulating such serv-
ices, even those offered on an intrastate basis. After unsuccessfully con-
1. 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
2. In re Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regs. (Third Computer
Inquiry), Report and Order, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 603 (1986) [hereinafter Computer III
Order].
3. Enhanced services are defined as those "which employ computer processing applica-
tions that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's
transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured informa-
tion; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information." 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1989).
The FCC and state regulators differentiate between "basic services," e.g., the use of telephone
lines for simple voice communication, and "enhanced services," since basic service is regulated
as a monopoly telecommunication service, while enhanced service is capable of being offered as
a competitive service and is "not suitable for regulation." Note, Resale, Shared Use and De-
regulation: Can the "Invisible Hand" Hold on to Ma Bell?, 35 FED. COMM. L.J. 209, 209
(1983).
4. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
5. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988).
6. Louisiana Public Service, 476 U.S. at 370-71.
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testing the FCC's preemption order through the rulemaking process, the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and other state regula-
tory agencies filed suit against the FCC to protect their authority under
the Communications Act to regulate intrastate telecommunications serv-
ices.7 The state regulators challenged the FCC's interpretation of the
Communications Act and raised the question of who should make deci-
sions about telecommunications policy, or more specifically, who should
regulate enhanced services. The Ninth Circuit's decision in California v.
FCC guarantees, for the present, that state regulators will continue to
determine intrastate telecommunications policy and establish the cost
and quality of service for rate payers.
This Note focuses on the Computer III Order, particularly on the
FCC's preemption order within this decision and the later Ninth Circuit
decision rendering the Computer III Order invalid. Part I of this Note
describes the regulatory events leading up to the FCC's Computer III
Order, as well as its key elements. Part II of this Note discusses the
Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana Public Service, which defines the
limits of FCC preemption under the Communications Act. Part II also
analyzes federal courts of appeals decisions preceding the Ninth Circuit's
decision in California v. FCC. I This Note then presents the arguments of
the litigants and analyzes the court's decision in California v. FCC in
Part III. In Part IV, this Note recommends amendments to the Commu-
nications Act that may encourage consensus among state regulators and
the FCC. Finally, in Part V, this Note concludes that state regulators,
and ultimately consumers, have been best served by the Ninth Circuit's
decision which found for the State of California and prohibited the FCC
from preempting state regulation of intrastate enhanced services.
Although California v. FCC presented the Ninth Circuit with a hard
case, the court avoided making bad law by preserving the dual regulatory
scheme established in the Communications Act.
I
Regulatory Background
In 1934, when Congress enacted the Communications Act, tele-
phone companies offered simple voice communication service. Due to
the lack of competition and the high cost of market entry, telecommuni-
7. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
8. Public Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 886 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989); National Ass'n of Reg.
Util. Conmm'rs v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 883 F.2d
104, (D.C. Cir. 1989); Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Hawaii Pub. Util. Comm'n, 827 F.2d 1264 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1218 (1988); California v. FCC, 798 F.2d 1515 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
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cations service was considered to be a natural monopoly.9 In order to
protect consumers from price gouging and discriminatory practices by
monopoly providers,'° Congress authorized the FCC under the Commu-
nications Act "to regulate the price, availability, quality[,] and profitabil-
ity"'" of telecommunications services provided by common carriers.12
Under traditional rate of return regulation, a regulated company is
guaranteed a return on its investments (e.g., facilities, lines, cables) but
must provide the regulator with records of its earnings and reasonable
costs of providing service.13 After reviewing this information, the regula-
tor determines the proper rates or tariffs 4 at which services are offered.
Reasonable prices for consumers and a sufficient rate of return for inves-
tors are the goals of such regulation. '5 However, when a regulated com-
pany provides both unregulated and regulated services, the company has
an opportunity to shift costs from the unregulated to the regulated ser-
vice. This practice, known as cross-subsidization or cost-shifting, results
in higher rates for the regulated service, and lower prices for the unregu-
lated service, through which the company may undercut its competi-
tors.16 Telephone companies that provide both common carrier services
(i.e., basic, regulated, telephone services) and noncommon carrier, or
competitive, unregulated services, are able to shift costs more easily. The
development of computer technology, which presented new ways for
telecommunications companies to engage in cross-subsidization and
predatory pricing, inspired the FCC to develop new rules to counter such
activities. 1
9. McKenna, Preemption Under the Communications Act, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 18
(1985); Note, The Computer Inquiries: Mapping the Communication/Information Processing
Terrain, 33 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 58 (1981).
10. Note, supra note 9, at 58.
11. Id. at 55.
12. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 201-224 (1988).
13. Note, supra note 9, at 59-60.
14. "Tariffs include the times and conditions of service furnished and the prices to be
charged based on a reasonable rate of return after payment of costs in providing the service."
Id. at 70 n.44.
15. Id. at 60-61.
16. Note, A Comparative Study of the Regulatory Treatment of Enhanced Services in the
United States and the European Community, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 415, 416 (1988); see
Note, supra note 9, at 61-62. Tariffs for regulated services guarantee a company a certain rate
of return. If a company also seeks to provide unregulated services, for which it must compete
with others, the company may pay for some of the cost of the unregulated services with income
from its regulated services, enabling it to keep the price of the unregulated services low. Thus,
it becomes less risky for the company to provide unregulated services.
17. Note, supra note 16, at 416-17; see Note, supra note 9, at 64.
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A. The First Computer Inquiry
In 1966, the FCC initiated an inquiry as to whether "data process-
ing, computer information, and message switching services, or any
particular combination thereof" should be regulated under the Commu-
nications Act. i" The FCC noted that computer and data processing
companies were becoming dependent upon telecommunications to make
their services widely available.19 The FCC also noted that telecommuni-
cations common carriers were becoming dependent upon computers to
provide more efficient service2' and to provide new services that would be
competitive with those offered by the computer and data processing
companies.2 '
As a result, the FCC published the Tentative Decision,2 2 stating
that services which were clearly communications services would be regu-
lated under Title II of the Communications Act, while services that in-
volved data processing would be unregulated.23 The FCC created
definitional categories to determine whether a service would be regulated
(telecommunications) or competitive (data-processing) and created hy-
brid categories.24 In future cases, the FCC would decide on an ad hoc
basis whether a service was a hybrid-communications or hybrid-data
processing service.25
In addition to this definitional approach to regulation, the FCC de-
termined that telecommunications common carriers would only be al-
lowed to provide competitive data processing services through a separate
subsidiary.26 The FCC determined that only "maximum separation"
18. In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Comm. Servs. and Facils., Notice of Inquiry, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, para. 18 (1966) [hereinafter
Computer I Notice].
19. Id. para. 1.
20. Id. para. 10. The interdependence of computer and communications services has been
termed "compunications," although this term has not been widely used. Note, supra note 9, at
63-64 (attributing the term to Anthony G. Oettinger, Director of Program Information Re-
sources Policy at Harvard University).
21. Id. para. 15.
22. In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Comm. Servs. and Facils., Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970) [hereinafter Com-
puter I Tentative Decision], modified in Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971)
[hereinafter Computer I Final Decision], affid in part sub nom GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474
F.2d 724 (2d Cir.), order on remand, 40 F.C.C.2d 293 (1973).
23. Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 22, para. 20.
24. Id. para. 15. These definitions are codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1989). Computer
I Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, Appendix A at 287 (1971).
25. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 22, paras. 25-27.
26. Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 22, para. 36. The separate subsidiary would
be required to hire separate officers and employees, maintain separate accounts, and prepare
separate annual reports. Id. All agreements between the subsidiary and parent corporation
would be reported to the FCC, and any communications services or facilities acquired by the
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could prevent common carriers from engaging in cross subsidization,
predatory pricing, and unfair competition." The FCC determined that it
was only necessary to apply this maximum separation policy to common
carriers earning over one million dollars a year, but only the American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T) fell into this category.28 However,
such line drawing was irrelevant since AT&T and the Bell Operating
Companies (BOCs) were already prohibited from providing competitive,
non-common carrier services under a 1956 consent decree (Consent
Decree).29
Although several telephone companies contested the FCC's actions,
asserting that the FCC had no authority to regulate data processing serv-
ices under the Communications Act,30 the Second Circuit upheld Com-
puter .31 However, the substantive regulations of Computer I created
more problems for the FCC than did the issue of its authority under the
Communications Act. The definitional approach and the hybrid cate-
gory proved to be awkward to apply, and the FCC's ad hoc approach for
hybrid services created a lengthy and unpredictable process for common
carriers seeking to offer new services.
3 2
B. The Second Computer Inquiry
In 1976, recognizing that technological developments had outgrown
the definitional approach of Computer I, the FCC initiated a second
rulemaking proceeding concerning the interdependence of computers
and communications.3 3 In this proceeding, the FCC sought to develop a
new definitional framework that would avoid the gray area of hybrid
services34 while maintaining a policy of maximum separation.3" After
five years of receiving and analyzing comments from industry representa-
tives and state regulators, the FCC concluded that a definitional scheme
that differentiated between regulated and unregulated services as "basic
subsidiary from the parent would be subject to the same tariffs applicable to any other cus-
tomer. Id.
27. Id. para. 35.
28. Id. para. 36.
29. Id. paras. 24, 43. In a 1956 antitrust action filed by the Justice Department against
AT&T, AT&T and its affiliates were prohibited from manufacturing, selling, or engaging in
any non-common carrier services. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH)
68,246, at 71,137-38 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 1956).
30. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 22, para. 5.
31. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 730 (2d Cir. 1973).
32. Note, supra note 9, at 64-66; Note, supra note 3, at 213, 223.
33. In re Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Rep., Notice ofInquiry
and Proposed Rulemaking, 61 F.C.C.2d 103, para. 8 (1976).
34. Id para. 22.
35. Id. para. 15.
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services" and "enhanced services" would be the most effective. 36 In ad-
dition, the FCC relieved all carriers except AT&T from compliance with
the maximum separation requirement, 37 concluded that customer prem-
ises equipment 38 (CPE) should be deregulated and offered as a competi-
tive service, 39 and determined that the Consent Decree did not prohibit
AT&T from offering CPE or enhanced services.'
The FCC defined a "basic service" as "a pure transmission capabil-
ity over a communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of
its interaction with customer supplied information." 4 ' In plain English,
basic services facilitate the transmission of information from one point to
another. "Enhanced services," on the other hand, are any services other
than basic services. The FCC defines enhanced services as those "which
employ computer processing applications that act on the format, content,
code, protocol[,] or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted infor-
mation; provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured infor-
mation; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information."42
Automatic teller machines, electronic mail systems, voice messaging, and
computerized data bases such as LEXIS and WESTLAW are common
examples of enhanced services.4 3  The FCC believed that these defini-
tional categories would provide a more certain regulatory structure to
common carriers and computer and data processing companies."
36. In re Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regs. (Second Com-
puter Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, paras. 5-7 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II
Final Decision].
37. Id., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 50, paras. 64-71 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Computer II Reconsideration Order].
38. Customer premises equipment is telecommunications equipment, provided by the car-
rier or a competitor, that is located on the customer's premises, i.e., "the basic telephone,
answering machines ... and PBX [private branch exchange] switchboards." Computer &
Comm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 204 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
938 (1983).
39. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 36, para. 9; Computer II Reconsideration Or-
der, supra note 37, para. 46; In re Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regs. (Second Computer Inquiry), Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsidera-
tion, 88 F.C.C.2d 512, para. 3 (1981).
40. Computer H Final Decision, supra note 36, para. 13.
41. Id. para 96.
42. Id. para. 5; see 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1989).
43. Note, supra note 16, at 415; see Brief for FCC at 7 n.7, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d
1217 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 87-7230 and consolidated cases). LEXIS® owned by Mead Data
Central, Inc., and WESTLAW® owned by West Publishing Co., are databases that include
federal and state court opinions, law review articles, and other legal research materials. A user
can "go online" by keying a password into a computer terminal. The computer will automati-
cally telephone the main database, and the user will have access to thousands of cases and
other materials by putting in the necessary search words. Thus, an individual can access an
amazing array of information by using a computer and a telephone line.
44. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 36, para. 42.
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In addition to interpreting the Consent Decree to allow AT&T to
offer enhanced services and CPE through structural separation, the FCC
agreed that AT&T could petition the FCC for a waiver from the struc-
tural separation requirements if a certain enhanced service could only be
offered "through network facilities" or if it would be too costly to pro-
vide the service through a separate subsidiary.45 Although the FCC cre-
ated a more concrete regulatory structure in Computer II than it had in
Computer I, this decision was no more durable. Several parties, includ-
ing the Department of Justice, contested the FCC's authority to enact
such regulations.' The D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC's decisions in
Computer I,47 but The Department of Justice contested the FCC's inter-
pretation of the Consent Decree in a New Jersey district court.48
C. AT&Ts Divestiture and the Modified Final Judgment
In 1982, while the appeal of Computer II was pending, Judge
Greene of the D.C. Circuit approved a settlement, known as the Modi-
fied Final Judgment, in an antitrust suit brought against AT&T by the
Department of Justice, which sought the divestiture of the BOCs and
Western Electric from AT&T.49 In the Modified Final Judgment, AT&T
agreed to submit a reorganization plan for the divestiture of the BOCs
from AT&T,5  and in return, the Department of Justice agreed to release
AT&T from the operating restrictions of the Consent Decree.5'
Under the reorganization plan, AT&T divested itself of its twenty-
two BOCs and reorganized them into seven regional holding compa-
nies." Under the Modified Final Judgment, Judge Greene prohibited
45. Computer II Reconsideration Order, supra note 37, para. 19.
46. Note, supra note 16, at 422.
47. Computer & Comm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
48. Note, supra note 16, at 422; see United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F.
Supp. 131, 138 n.17 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983).
49. American Tel. & Tel., 552 F. Supp. at 139. Although the bulk of the case represents
Judge Greene's final judgment, for simplicity and in compliance with the practice of courts,
this Note will refer to the decision as the Modified Final Judgment or the MFJ. Id. at 226.
50. American TeL & TeL, 552 F. Supp. at 226.
51. Id
52. See AT&T Plan of Reorganization (filed Dec. 16, 1982), approved in United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 993 n.9 (D.D.C.), affid sub nom. California v. United
States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1984). The seven regional holding companies, commonly known as the
"RHCs," currently own 23 BOCs. TELECOM PUBLISHING GROUP, INSIDE THE RHCs: A
MANAGEMENT REPORT ON THE SEVEN REGIONAL HOLDING COMPANIES (1987). However,
as the FCC and others refer to the RHCs as the "BOCs," this Note uses the term BOCs.
Computer III Order, supra note 2, para. 24 n.64.
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AT&T from providing local exchange, or intra-LATA service5  and
from entering the electronic publishing market for seven years.' The
BOCs were prohibited from providing inter-LATA service,55 manufac-
turing CPE, and engaging in certain businesses, including "information
services," under broad line-of-business restrictions. 6  While Judge
Greene approved many restrictions on the BOCs' activities, he left the
FCC to decide whether to impose structural separation requirements on
the new BOCs." The FCC subsequently restricted the BOCs from pro-
viding CPE, enhanced services, and cellular services, except through sep-
arate subsidiaries,58 conditioning these restrictions on the BOCs' ability
to cross-subsidize, and noted that the FCC would review this decision in
two years. 59
However, as soon as the FCC acted, both the BOCs and AT&T
sought relief from the structural separation requirements for providing
CPEW and waivers from structural separation for enhanced services.6
The waiver procedures of Computer II, combined with the break-up of
AT&T, created more uncertainty in the regulatory environment rather
than the stability the FCC expected from Computer I. 62
53. American Tel. & Tel., 552 F. Supp. at 141. A "LATA" is similar to a local exchange
and "stands for Local Access Transport Area, a term that describes the geographical areas...
in which the BOCs provide service." Computer III Order, supra note 2, para. 24 n.65.
54. American Tel. & Tel., 552 F. Supp. at 185-86.
55. Id. at 141, 188, 227.
56. Id. at 186, 189-91, 227. The Modified Final Judgment defines information services as
"the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, re-
trieving, utilizing, or making available information which may be conveyed via telecommuni-
cations, except that such service does not include any use of any such capability for the
management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a
telecommunications service." Id. at 229. Judge Greene interprets information services and
enhanced services to be "equivalent." Id. at 178 n.198.
57. Id. at 193 n.251; see Computer III Order, supra note 2, para. 27 n.72.
58. Policy and Rules Concerning the Furnishing of Customer Premises Equip., Enhanced
Serv. and Cellular Comm. Equip. By the Bell Operating Cos., Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d
1117, para. 3 (1984) (BOC Separation Order), affid sub nom. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 740
F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1984); Computer III Order, supra note 2, para. 27.
59. Computer III Order, supra note 2, paras. 29-30. Judge Greene has lifted some of the
line-of-business restrictions. As a result, the BOCs can now provide noncontent based infor-
mation services. Less Than Haifa Loaf: Judge Greene Refuses to Unleash the Regional Hold-
ing Companies, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 15, 1987, at 30.
60. Computer III Order, supra note 2, paras. 36, 39.
61. Id. paras. 33-38.
62. Note, supra note 16, at 425.
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D. The Third Computer Inquiry
In response to the radical changes in the structure of the telecom-
munications market, the FCC's Third Computer Inquiry63 in 1986 ques-
tioned whether structural separation was the best way to regulate
common carrier activities under new market conditions." On the basis
of preliminary analysis which showed that the costs of structural separa-
tion outweighed the benefits,65 and that structural separation had hin-
dered the introduction of innovative services,' the FCC sought
comments on its proposal to replace structural separation requirements
with "non-structural safeguards" to prevent anti-competitive activity by
AT&T and the BOCs. 67 Envisioning a more freely competitive market,
the FCC proposed to make the entire telecommunications network open
to all competitors through a program called "Comparably Efficient Inter-
connection., 6' Recognizing that basic services are the building blocks of
enhanced services, the FCC proposed that carriers provide competitors
"equal access" to their basic service networks through Comparably Effi-
cient Interconnection in exchange for the ability to provide integrated,
instead of separated, telecommunications services. 69
L Open Network Architecture versus Comparably Efficient Interconnection
In the Computer III Order, the FCC announced Comparably Effi-
cient Interconnection and Open Network Architecture as the short- and
long-term means, respectively, for relieving AT&T and the BOs from
structural separation requirements and achieving the ultimate goal of a
completely deregulated telecommunications market. The FCC envi-
sioned Comparably Efficient Interconnection as the initial case-by-case
means for allowing AT&T and the BOCs to offer integrated enhanced
and basic services until the companies developed the more detailed Open
Network Architecture plans.7'
63. Computer III Order, supra note 2; Id, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsid-
eration, 2 FCC Rcd. 3035 (1987) [hereinafter Phase I Reconsideration Order]; Report and Or-
der, 2 FCC Rcd. 3072 (1987) [hereinafter Phase II Order].
64. In re Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regs. (Third Computer
Inquiry), Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,581, paras. 18-19 (1985).
65. Id para. 19.
66. Id. paras. 6-9.
67. Id. paras. 22, 120.
68. Id paras. 116, 118-120.
69. Id para. 120; Computer III Order, supra note 2, paras. 2, 44.
70. Note, supra note 16, at 426. Comparably Efficient Interconnection is a service-specific
requirement. Computer III Order, supra note 2, para. 115. Under the FCC's Comparably
Efficient Interconnection program, each time AT&T or the BOCs decide to offer a new en-
hanced service that uses their basic service facilities, the carriers must allow competitors
"equal access." Id. para. 147. Equal access means that AT&T and the BOCs must allow
competitors to use their basic services on an unbundled basis, provide competitors with techni-
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Open Network Architecture is a much broader concept than Com-
parably Efficient Interconnection: It is the ultimate "equal access"
plan."1 The FCC defines Open Network Architecture as "the overall de-
sign of a carrier's basic network facilities and services to permit all users
of the basic network, including the enhanced service operations of the
carrier and its competitors, to interconnect to specific basic network
functions and interfaces on an unbundled and 'equal access' basis." '72
While AT&T and the BOCs are required to file a Comparably Efficient
Interconnection plan with the FCC before each enhanced service offer-
ing, once the FCC has approved a carrier's Open Network Architecture
plan, the carrier may provide enhanced services on an integrated basis
without submitting service specific plans.73 The FCC has forged ahead
with the Comparably Efficient Interconnection/Open Network Architec-
ture program, despite the CPUC's appeal of Computer M1."
cal specifications, and provide more than "rough comparability" in the quality and efficiency
of interconnection. Id.; see Phase I Reconsideration Order, supra note 63, para. 92. The FCC
seeks to have identical interconnection quality and efficiency but recognizes that equal access
"does not demand impossible or grossly inefficient over-engineering of the network so that
absolute equality is always achieved." Id
Prior to offering each enhanced service, AT&T and the BOCs must file a Comparably
Efficient Interconnection plan with the FCC for approval, describing how they will implement
the Comparably Efficient Interconnection requirements. Computer III Order, supra note 2,
para. 115. These plans are subject to public comment. Id In addition to filing a Comparably
Efficient Interconnection plan, AT&T and the BOCs must file cost allocation plans with the
FCC that "properly allocate the joint and common costs created by their provision of en-
hanced services unseparated from their basic services." Id paras. 226, 236. They must also
disclose information to competitors about changes in their network at the same time that they
inform their employees who market enhanced services. Id para. 249. At the customer's re-
quest, AT&T and the BOCs must keep Customer Proprietary Network Information confiden-
tial or make it available to other enhanced services providers. Id para. 262.
71. Fowler, Halprin & Schlichting, "Back to the Future": A Model for Telecommunica-
tions, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 145, 191 (1986) [hereinafter Fowler].
72. Computer III Order, supra note 2, para. 113.
73. Id para. 201.
74. AT&T and the BOCs were required to file plans with the FCC by February 1, 1988,
describing in detail how they intended to implement Open Network Architecture. Id. para.
220. In November 1988, the FCC partly approved these plans, and directed the BOCs to file
amended Open Network Architecture plans by May 19, 1989. In re Filing and Review of Open
Network Architecture Plans, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Red. 1, paras. 1, 7-9
(1989). The FCC has approved amendments for several BOCs. See US West, Inc. Plan for
Comparably Efficient Interconnection, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Red. 5512
(1989); South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. and S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. Plan for Comparably Efficient
Interconnection, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 6825 (1989). Also, on recon-
sideration, the FCC has modified the Open Network Architecture requirements for AT&T,
allowing AT&T to continue to file Comparably Efficient Interconnection plans as it develops
new enhanced services, rather than relying solely on an Open Network Architecture plan.
Phase I Reconsideration Order, supra note 63, paras. 32, 48. The FCC has approved AT&T's
Open Network Architecture plan and FCC approval of several AT&T Comparably Efficient
Interconnection plans is pending. See In re Filing and Review of Open Architecture Plans,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rod. 2449 (1989); Pleading Cycle Established for
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Through this program, the FCC changed its regulatory orientation
and policies concerning the provision of enhanced services altogether.
While the FCC's interest in removing structural separation requirements
resulted in part from the divestiture of AT&T, it was spurred on by the
move toward deregulation and free market economics. Applying classi-
cal microeconomic theory, several authors, including the former Chair-
man of the FCC, called for the removal of structural separation
requirements and replacement by a competitive marketplace."
The Computer III Order established that AT&T and the BOCs
would be released from the structural separation requirements for pro-
viding enhanced services if they filed Comparably Efficient Interconnec-
tion and Open Network Architecture plans and complied with the FCC's
non-structural safeguards (i.e., accounting, network disclosure, and cus-
tomer proprietary network information (CPNI) requirements).76 In ad-
dition, the FCC preempted state regulators from regulating intrastate
enhanced services or imposing structural separation requirements or "in-
consistent" nonstructural safeguards on intrastate services."
The FCC made several arguments in the Computer III Order that
do not necessarily follow from the facts the FCC provided.78 First, the
FCC stated that nonstructural safeguards would work just as well as
structural separation requirements to prevent carriers from engaging in
cross subsidization and discriminatory activity through the control of
bottleneck facilities.79 However, the FCC conceded in the Computer III
Comments on AT&T's Comparably Efficient Interconnection Plan, Public Notice, 4 FCC Rcd.
5669 (1989); Pleading Cycle Established for Comments on AT&rs Petition for Waiver, Public
Notice, 4 FCC Red. 6816 (1989).
75. See generally Lavey, Ending Structural Separation for Telephone Companies, 18
CONN. L. REv. 81 (1985); Fowler, supra note 71.
76. Computer III Order, supra note 2, paras. 3-5, 100. Although the FCC also considered
the regulatory status of protocol processing, voice message storage services, and network chan-
nel terminating equipment in this proceeding, this Note focuses on the Comparably Efficient
Interconnection/Open Network Architecture aspects of Computer III and the accompanying
preemption order. Id. paras. 7-8. In its Phase II Order, the FCC concluded that Comparably
Efficient Interconnection/Open Network Architecture requirements would not apply to the
independent telephone companies, as they "lack the same potential as the BOCs to engage in
anticompetitive conduct in the enhanced services marketplace." Phase II Order, supra note 63,
paras. 9, 188 (1987).
77. Computer III Order, supra note 2, para. 334.
78. MCI Telecommunications Corp., a petitioner in California v. FCC, asserted that the
FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in deciding the Computer III Order. See Supplemental
Brief of Petitioners, MCI Telecomm. Corp. at 1 n.1, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th
Cir. 1990) (No. 87-7230 and consolidated cases). The Ninth Circuit agreed and invalidated
the order. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990); see also infra notes 233-35 and
accompanying text.
79. Computer III Order, supra note 2, paras. 77, 97. A "bottleneck" occurs where one
common carrier controls the facilities that competitors require to provide communications or
enhanced services to their customers. Note, supra note 16, at 417.
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Order that the abilities and incentives of AT&T and the BOCs to en-
gage in cross subsidization and anticompetitive activities had not
diminished.80
Second, the FCC asserted that the costs of requiring carriers to
maintain separate subsidiaries for enhanced services outweigh public
benefits" but did not provide convincing quantitative data to support its
arguments.82 Third, while the FCC asserted that nonstructural safe-
guards would be self-enforcing, 3 it conceded that there were no guaran-
tees that carriers would not discriminate or shift costs." The FCC
further asserted that in the event of abuses, its complaint process would
resolve the problems.8 ' Several intervenors protested that such a post
hoc remedy would not be sufficient.8 6
Finally, the FCC asserted that this scheme would promote greater
competition and result in more efficient and innovative services.8" How-
ever, the FCC has two primary mandates under the Communications
Act. The FCC must 1) provide the public with efficient service and 2)
provide the service at reasonable cost to the ratepayers.88 By recom-
mending this deregulatory scheme, the FCC expressed its willingness to
gamble with the ability of ratepayers to bear the costs of telecommunica-
tions services for its free market experiment,89 and even admitted that the
consumer would ultimately bear the cost.9
2. The Preemption Order
It is interesting to note that former FCC Chairman Fowler asserted
in an article describing the Comparably Efficient Interconnection/Open
Network Architecture proposal that "[t]his proposal is not designed to
impose a federal view on the states."9 Despite the Chairman's state-
ment, the FCC preempted the states from regulating enhanced services in
80. Computer III Order, supra note 2, paras. 83, 96, 193.
81. IM paras. 3, 74, 98.
82. Phase I Reconsideration Order, supra note 63, paras. 14-15; see Lavey, supra note 75,
at 103-04; see also Frieden, The Third Computer Inquiry: A Deregulatory Dilemma, 38 FED.
COMM. L.J. 383, 387-88 (1987).
83. Computer III Order, supra note 2, para. 211.
84. As proof of the continued ability of the BOCs to cross-subsidize, the FCC recently
fined two NYNEX companies for buying "equipment, services and supplies from another
NYNEX subsidiary" at inflated prices and passing the cost on to customers. N.Y. Times, Feb.
9, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
85. Computer IMI Order, supra note 2, para. 222.
86. Phase I Reconsideration Order, supra note 63, para. 57.
87. Computer III Order, supra note 2, paras. 76, 98.
88. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
89. Frieden, supra note 82, at 408.
90. Computer III Order, supra note 2, para. 171; Frieden, supra note 82, at 410.
91. Fowler, supra note 71, at 200.
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Computer III Although the Computer III Order was published nearly
three weeks after the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC,92 which limited the FCC to
regulating interstate activities, the FCC did not address the effects of
Louisiana Public Service on its decision to preempt state regulation of
intrastate enhanced services.
The FCC asserted that the states were preempted from regulating
enhanced services under the D.C. Circuit's decision in Computer and
Communications Industry Association v. FCC,93 which upheld the FCC's
findings in Computer II that enhanced services were not common carrier
services and that the FCC could preempt state regulation of CPE and
enhanced services. State regulators petitioned the FCC for reconsidera-
tion following the Louisiana Public Service decision, but the FCC af-
firmed its original decision to preempt the states.94 After the rulemaking
proceedings were final, the CPUC and other state regulatory commis-
sions filed suit in the Ninth Circuit challenging the FCC's preemption
order.
While the competitive, free market policy goals of the FCC were
clearly at issue in California v. FCC," the debate over Computer III has
focused primarily on the legal issue of the FCC's preemptive power fol-
lowing Louisiana Public Service. The states are unlikely to persuade the
FCC to change its policies; however, they have been able to limit the
FCC's actions by retaining regulatory control over the intrastate activi-
ties of telephone companies.96
II
FCC Preemption and Louisiana Public Service
Commission v. FCC
A. FCC Preemption Before Louisiana Public Service
The FCC and the states share regulatory authority over telecommu-
nications under the Communications Act. The Communications Act
grants the FCC power over "all interstate and foreign communication by
wire or radio,"97 and expressly denies the FCC authority over "charges,
92. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
93. 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983); see Computer III
Order, supra note 2, paras. 343, 347-348.
94. Phase I Reconsideration Order, supra note 63, paras. 6, 173.
95. 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
96. See California v. FCC, 798 F.2d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1986); National Ass'n of Reg. Util.
Comm'rs v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also infra text accompanying notes 140-
47, 160-78.
97. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1988).
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classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in con-
nection with intrastate communication service by wire or radio."9
These matters were left to the states. However, the telecommunications
network performs both interstate and intrastate functions, and is not
clearly delineated as either interstate or intrastate.99 For many years, the
regulatory philosophy of state regulators and the FCC was consistent,
and the issue of jurisdiction rarely arose." However, as the FCC began
to promote policies of competitiveness and deregulation, this regulatory
harmony unraveled and the states and the FCC have been involved in a
turf battle ever since. 0 1 This conflict is not just over jurisdiction; the
heart of the issue is regulatory philosophy.
The FCC has been successful in implementing its policies of compet-
itiveness and deregulation. The ability of the FCC to preempt the states
from implementing regulations that would impede these goals has been
the key to its success."°2 The FCC has broadened its authority over tele-
communications policymaking through several principal cases.
In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., '03 the Supreme Court
found that the FCC had jurisdiction to regulate cable television under a
theory that such jurisdiction was "reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regula-
tion of television broadcasting" under Title III of the Communications
Act." 4 The FCC has justified the extension of its regulatory jurisdiction
by asserting "ancillary jurisdiction" through its broad mandate under
section 151 of the Communications Act "to make available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, [n]ation-
wide, and worldwide wire and radio communications service."' 0 5 While
Title III specifically gives the FCC jurisdiction over broadcasting activi-
ties, section 151 is not a jurisdictional provision but a policy statement.
In the second case, North Carolina Utilities Commission v. FCC, "
the FCC confronted the jurisdictional problems of section 152 but as-
98. Id. § 152(b).
99. Hating & Levitz, The Law and Economics of Federalism in Telecommunications 41
FED. COMM. L.J. 261, 295 (1989); McKenna, supra note 9, at 14-15, 58; McKenna, Preemp-
tion Reversed- The Supreme Court's Decision in Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC,
39 ADMIN L. REv. 43, 54-55 (1987).
100. Cain, Constitutional Struggle Over Telecommunications Regulation, 10 HASTINGS
CoMM/ENT L.J. 1, 6-7 (1987); Haring & Levitz, supra note 99, at 295.
101. Haring & Levitz, supra note 99, at 263, 296-97; McKenna, supra note 9, at 4.
102. McKenna, supra note 9, at 2; Miller, Ideology, Jurisdiction, and Deregulation of the
Telephone Network Pun. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 2, 1986, at 14, 15.
103. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
104. Id at 178.
105. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
106. 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976).
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serted that federal regulations preempted state regulations where the
state rules thwarted the effectiveness of federal policy. The Fourth Cir-
cuit was receptive to the FCC's assertion, holding that the FCC could
preempt the states from issuing regulations that would interfere with the
federal policy of CPE interconnection provided by nontelephone compa-
nies." The court held that section 152(b) limited the FCC's regulatory
authority only as to "local services, facilities[,] and disputes that in their
nature and effect are separable from and do not substantially affect the
conduct or development of interstate communications."10 The test de-
veloped by the Fourth Circuit became an effective tool with which the
FCC could extend its regulatory authority. Several circuits adopted the
test and applied it favorably to the FCC."°
The third case, Computer and Communications Industry Association
v. FCC,"' ("CCIA"), combined the theory of ancillary jurisdiction and
the North Carolina Utilities exception to section 152(b), "producing a
sweeping result of remarkable implications."" ' In that case, the FCC
asserted, first, that it had authority to regulate CPE under ancillary juris-
diction, since CPE was not a common carrier service subject to Title II
regulation. Second, the FCC argued that CPE was not severable as an
intrastate or interstate facility under section 152(b). 2 The D.C. Circuit
upheld both of the FCC's assertions in CCIA, and found that the FCC
could also extend its jurisdiction to enhanced services." 3 Following
CCIA, there was a belief that the FCC would never lose a preemption
battle and that the FCC would continue to dictate national telecommuni-
cations policy."I4 However, the Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana
Public Service 115 tempered that belief.
B. Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC
Soon after the D.C. Circuit approved the FCC's preemptive action
in CCIA, the FCC issued an order preempting the states from requiring
telephone companies to use depreciation methods which differed from
107. Id. at 793.
108. Id.
109. Cain, supra note 100, at 10-15; McKenna, supra note 9, at 52; Phillips, Federal Pre-
emption of Conflicting Telecommunications Regulations, 7 GLENDALE L. REv. 141, 152
(1987).
110. 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983); see also supra note 93
and accompanying text.
111. McKenna, supra note 9, at 39; McKenna, supra note 99, at 53.
112. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 36, paras. 172, 175, 184-189.
113. Computer & Comm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 209-10, 213 (D.C. Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983); see McKenna, supra note 9, at 38-39.
114. McKenna, supra note 9, at 62.
115. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
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the method that the FCC had adopted. Seeking to encourage greater
capital recovery within the telephone industry, the FCC changed the
method of depreciating telephone plant. 1 6 State regulators sought re-
view of the FCC's decision, claiming that the FCC was prohibited from
regulating intrastate "charges" under section 152(b) of the Communica-
tions Act. The reviewing court upheld the FCC's preemption order,
finding that section 152(b) did not bar FCC preemption. 1 7 The Fourth
Circuit applied the North Carolina Utilities test and held that allowing
the states to set different depreciation rules would "substantially affect"
the federal policy of a more competitive telecommunications industry."'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed." 9
The Supreme Court made a cursory review of the FCC's policy ar-
guments in its decision and asserted that "we do not assess the wisdom of
the asserted federal policy of encouraging competition within the tele-
communications industry."' 20 The Supreme Court decided this case
under traditional preemption analysis by looking at the Communications
Act to determine "whether Congress intended that federal regulation su-
persede state law."' 2 ' The Court focused its decision on sections 151 and
152 of the Act, as the FCC relied on the broad mandate of section 151 to
justify preemption, and the states argued that section 152(b) established a
dual regulatory system. The FCC also relied on section 220 of Title II of
the Communications Act, under which the FCC can set depreciation
rules and preempt inconsistent state depreciation practices. 122 The Court
rejected the FCC's interpretation of the Communications Act, stating
that "[b]y its terms, [section 152(b)] fences off from FCC reach or regula-
tion intrastate matters .... including matters 'in connection with' intra-
state service." 123 The Court held that "[section] 152(b)... contains not
only a substantive jurisdictional limitation on the FCC's power, but also
a rule of statutory construction" under which sections 151 and 152(b) do
not conflict, but co-exist. 24 The Court also rejected the FCC's argument
that section 220 preempted state regulation, stating that that section is
subject to the jurisdictional limits of section 152.125
116. Id. at 360. Telephone plant refers to the equipment that telephone companies own
and use to operate the system, e.g., switching stations and telephone lines.
117. Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v. FCC, 737 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1984).
118. Id. at 392; Cain, supra note 100, at 17.
119. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 359, 363 (1986).
120. Id. at 359.
121. Id. at 369.
122. Id. at 367-68.
123. Id. at 370.
124. Id. at 370, 373.
125. Id. at 376-78.
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• The Court did acknowledge the dilemma presented by section 152,
stating that "the realities of technology and economics belie... a clean
parceling of responsibility" between the FCC and the states.126 How-
ever, the Court concluded that the Communications Act resolved this by
providing a "jurisdictional separations" process in section 410(c).'27
Through this process, the FCC determines "what portion of an asset is
employed to produce or deliver interstate as opposed to intrastate ser-
vice. '  The Court held that once the separation has been made, the
states and the FCC are free to "apply different rates and methods of
depreciation."' 2 9
The Court also rejected the FCC's argument, under the North Caro-
lina Utilities test that section 152(b) is only a bar to FCC preemption
when the matter is "separable from and [does] not substantially affect...
interstate communications." 3 ° The Court appeared to reject the North
Carolina Utilities test when it stated that "this argument ... misrepre-
sents the statutory scheme and the basis and test for [pre]emption."''
However, the Court later distinguished North Carolina Utilities from
Louisiana Public Service, leaving the impression that at least part of the
North Carolina Utilities test is still valid.' 32
Some commentators criticized the Supreme Court for its "literal"
interpretation of the Communications Act,'33 fearing that the FCC's
ability to implement its competitive policies would be limited. 34 The
Court, possibly anticipating such a response, properly stated that,"only
Congress can rewrite this statute."' However, the Court did not ham-
string the FCC by this decision. It left the FCC an important "out" in
footnote four. In this footnote, the Court distinguished North Carolina
Utilities from Louisiana Public Service, stating that "these cases are read-
ily distinguishable from those in which FCC [pre]emption of state regula-
tion was upheld where it was not possible to separate the interstate and
the intrastate components of the asserted FCC regulation."1 36 Thus, the
126. Id. at 360.
127. Id at 375.
128. Id.
129. Id
130. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787, 793 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1027 (1976); Louisiana Pub. Serv., 476 U.S. at 374.
131. Louisiana Pub. Serv., 476 U.S. at 374; McKenna, supra note 99, at 49-50.
132. Louisiana Pub. Serv., 476 U.S. at 375 n.4; see also McKenna, supra note 99, at 51-52,
54; Phillips, supra note 109, at 158.
133. Haring & Levitz, supra note 99, at 310; Phillips, supra note 109, at 159.
134. Cain, supra note 100, at 23; Haring & Levitz, supra note 99, at 264, 313; McKenna,
supra note 99, at 53; Miller, supra note 102, at 14, 16.
135. Louisiana Pub. Sery., 476 U.S. at 376.
136. Id. at 375 n.4 (emphasis in original).
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Court left the option open for the FCC to continue to preempt regulatory
action by the states.'37 Despite dire predictions by commentators that
Louisiana Public Service would limit the FCC's ability to implement its
competitive policies,1 38 the application of Louisiana Public Service and
footnote four in the courts of appeals has proved that those fears were
unfounded. 
139
C. Subsequent Courts of Appeals Cases
1. California v. FCC-FM Subcarrier
The first FCC preemption case to reach the federal courts of appeals
following Louisiana Public Service was California v. FCC, 4" ("FM Sub-
carrier"). In FM Subcarrier, the FCC preempted state regulation of
solely intrastate radio common carrier services provided on FM subcar-
rier frequencies on the basis that section 301 of Title III of the Communi-
cations Act, which establishes the FCC's authority over radio
transmission, superseded the states' authority to regulate intrastate radio
common carrier service under section 152(b). "'I In 1983, the FCC issued
an order allowing common carriers and nonbroadcast services to use FM
subchannels, effectively deregulating the subcarrier market. 142 Due to
the suspicion that state regulators would use their licensing authority to
prevent the entry of common carrier services into the interstate FM sub-
carrier market, the FCC issued a preemptive order. 43 However, this or-
der extended the FCC's preemptive power to purely intrastate common
carrier service on FM subchannels. 1"
Applying the Supreme Court's literal interpretation of section
152(b) in Louisiana Public Service, the D.C. Circuit reversed that portion
of the FCC's order that preempted "purely intrastate radio common car-
riage."' 145 The court held that the FCC had no authority to preempt
state regulation of intrastate common carrier services merely because it
would frustrate the FCC's policies.'"
FM Subcarrier is a prime example of the FCC using its preemptive
authority to prevent state regulation that would frustrate its free market
137. Haring & Levitz, supra note 99, at 313-14; McKenna supra note 99, at 54; Phillips,
supra note 109, at 166.
138. Cain, supra note 100, at 28, 30; Phillips, supra note 109, at 167.
139. Haring & Levitz, supra note 99, at 313, 322; Phillips, supra note 109, at 159.
140. 798 F.2d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (this case is commonly referred to as FMSubcarrier).
141. Id. at 1516-17.
142. Id. at 1517.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1518.
145. Id. at 1520.
146. Id. at 1519.
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policies. The D.C. Circuit aptly stated "[t]he Commission's logic would
... prepare the way for the complete elimination of any state role in the
regulation of intrastate radio common carriage. . . . [S]uch a result
would reduce section 152(b) to a nullity, violating the congressional in-
tent to establish a system of dual regulatory control ...."'
2. Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. Hawaii Public Utilities Commission
The Ninth Circuit was the second appellate court to hear an FCC
preemption case following Louisiana Public Service. Until California v.
FCC, Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. Hawaii Public Utilities Commission14 s
was the only decision issued by the Ninth Circuit interpreting Louisiana
Public Service. In Hawaiian Telephone, the FCC applied the same proce-
dures for separating the costs of interstate from intrastate telephone
plant149 to Hawaii that it applied to telephone plant on the Mainland. 5 °
The Hawaiian Telephone Company (HawTel) made an agreement with
the FCC and AT&T to phase in the new method by lowering interstate
rates while raising intrastate rates.151 Soon after the FCC issued an order
adopting this plan, HawTel filed for an increase in local rates with the
Hawaii Public Utilities Commission (HPUC).5 2 The HPUC allowed
only half of this increase. While an appeal of the HPUC's decision was
pending in the state courts, HawTel sought another rate increase for the
following year, and the HPUC again granted HawTel less than it had
requested. 153 This time, HawTel sought relief in the federal courts, as-
serting that the HPUC had violated the FCC's separations order and that
the FCC's order preempted the HPUC from applying its own separations
procedures. 
154
The Hawaiian Telephone court held that the HPUC was preempted
from applying a separations procedure for determining an intrastate rate
base that was inconsistent with that adopted by the FCC. 55 The court
interpreted Louisiana Public Service as providing that "it is only after a
uniform separations formula has been applied that a state's independent




148.. Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Hawaii Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 827 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988).
149. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
150. Hawaiian Tel., 827 F.2d at 1266.
151. Id. at 1267.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1267-68.
154. Id. at 1268, 1274.
155. Id. at 1276.
156. Id. (emphasis in orignial).
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The dissent claimed that such a holding "misconstrues and misap-
plies" Louisiana Public Service, as it appears to disregard the states' au-
thority over intrastate ratemaking.'I" While the majority's decision does
seem to contradict Louisiana Public Service, it merely identifies an addi-
tional weakness in the Communications Act concerning the jurisdictional
separations process, which, as the Supreme Court noted, only Congress
may correct.
Although the Ninth Circuit decided Hawaiian Telephone by apply-
ing Louisiana Public Service, the case could have been resolved more pre-
cisely by applying the rules governing the jurisdictional separations
process. Section 410(c) of the Communications Act provides for the cre-
ation of a Federal-State Joint Board to discuss the "jurisdictional separa-
tion of common carrier property and expenses between interstate and
intrastate operations."' 8 This Joint Board, composed of three FCC
commissioners and four commissioners of state regulatory commissions
appointed by the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commis-
sioners (NARUC), makes recommendations to the FCC concerning sep-
arations procedures.1"9 The FCC, however, retains the ultimate
authority to decide which procedures to adopt."W For example, in Ha-
waiian Telephone, the HPUC determined rates by using a different proce-
dure than that adopted by the FCC.
3. National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC-Inside
Wiring
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC,
161
("Inside Wiring"), was the first of three decisions issued by the D.C.
Circuit in the summer of 1989. Inside Wiring was a follow-up case to
Louisiana Public Service, in which the FCC sought to change the method
of depreciating inside wiring costs. In Inside Wiring, the FCC sought to
deregulate, or "detariff," the maintenance and installation of inside wir-
ing. 16 ' The FCC preempted the states from regulating inside wiring
costs, arguing that such regulation would impede the FCC's goal of a
fully deregulated, competitive inside wiring market. 63 The FCC as-
serted that inside wiring was not a common carrier service and that sec-
157. Id. at 1278 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
158. 47 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 880 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (this case is commonly referrd to as Inside Wiring).
162. Id. at 426. Inside wiring refers to the telephone wires that are located on a customer's
premises, whether in a residence or a business. Inside wiring is subject to dual regulation since




tion 152(b) was only applicable to common carrier services.'" Secondly,
the FCC claimed that, even if section 152(b) was applicable, inside wiring
was not severable into interstate and intrastate components.
1 65
The D.C. Circuit rejected the FCC's arguments that section 152(b)
was not a bar to preemption. Following Louisiana Public Service, the
court held that the plain language of section 152(b), "in connection with
intrastate communication service," does not limit the states to regulating
only common carrier services.' 66 The court also rejected the FCC's
claim that inside wiring was not separable into intrastate and interstate
components. The FCC claimed that where it has detariffed the installa-
tion and maintenance of inside wiring, the costs of such services are no
longer subject to the jurisdictional separations process.1 67 The court re-
jected this analysis as circular, which would lead to "unchecked author-
ity to force state deregulation of any activity [the FCC] chose to
deregulate at the interstate level."
1 68
Finally, the court held that where separation of dual jurisdiction
property was "a practical and economic impossibility,"' 69 the FCC,
when acting within its statutory authority, could preempt state regula-
tion which would negate "the exercise by the FCC of its own lawful
authority."1 70 The court also found that section 151 of the Communica-
tions Act gave the FCC the necessary authority to promote its policies of
deregulation and competition, invoking the FCC's ancillary jurisdic-
tion. 71 Under this highly deferential analysis, the court held that "the
FCC may preempt inconsistent state regulation so long as it can show
that the state regulation negates a valid federal policy.' 1 72 Thus, the
court reversed its position and based its decision on the negation of the
FCC's exercise of authority instead of applying the "practical and eco-
nomic impossibility" test. 173 The court held that the FCC could argua-
bly preempt state requirements for bundling inside wiring and basic
services because it might negate federal policy, but stated that "[t]he
FCC has the burden . . . of showing with some specificity" that such
regulations would negate the federal policy of competition.'
74
164. Id at 428.
165. Id at 426-27.
166. Id at 428; 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1988).
167. National Ass'n of Reg. WiL Comm'rs, 880 F.2d at 428.
168. Id at 429.
169. Id. (citing North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1043 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 429-30.
172. Id. at 431.
173. Id at 429.
174. Id. at 430.
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Inside Wiring is consistent with FM Subcarrier in limiting the FCC
to preempting state regulation only to the degree necessary to prevent
negation of the FCC's authority to regulate interstate activity. However,
there are several problems with the D.C. Circuit's decision. First, the
D.C. Circuit based the validity of the FCC's policies on the FCC's broad
regulatory authority under section 151, a finding contrary to Louisiana
Public Service and FM Subcarrier. In Louisiana Public Service, the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the FCC's reliance on section 151 to
provide the authority to preempt the state's use of inconsistent deprecia-
tion methods. 75 In FM Subcarrier, the D.C. Circuit rejected the FCC's
similar reliance on the broad language of section 301 as a statutory basis
for preemption. 176 The Inside Wiring court should have followed Louisi-
ana Public Service and FM Subcarrier to reject section 151 as a basis for
preemption. Despite this departure from Louisiana Public Service and
FM Subcarrier, the Inside Wiring court followed the merit of those cases
by placing the burden on the FCC to prove that state actions would ne-
gate the FCC's policy of creating a competitive telecommunications
market. 177
Second, the court used inconsistent language in Inside Wiring. In
the paragraphs following its decision to restrict the FCC to preempting
only state regulations that would "negate" its authority, the court
seemed to equate "interfere with," "thwart," and "frustrate" with the
term "negate."'' 78 In addition, the court shifts from an analysis of nega-
tion of FCC authority to the negation of FCC policy goals-a much
more deferential analysis. 179 While Inside Wiring does place limits on
the FCC's ability to preempt state regulation, the D.C. Circuit's inexact
and inconsistent language creates the opportunity for courts to treat the
FCC with greater deference than the Supreme Court may have intended.
4. Illinois Bell Telephone Company v. FCC-Sales Agency
One month after the D.C. Circuit issued its decision in Inside Wir-
ing, it decided another FCC preemption case. In Illinois Bell Telephone
Co. v. FCC, ' ("Sales Agency"), the party contesting the FCC's preemp-
tive order was Ameritech, one of the seven BOCs. The case arose out of
FCC orders concerning the relaxation of structural separation require-
ments for the provision of CPE and enhanced services by the BOCs and
175. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 370 (1986).
176. California v. FCC, 798 F.2d 1515, 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
177. National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs, 880 F.2d at 430.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 883 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (this case is commonly referred to as Sales Agency).
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AT&T following the break-up of AT&T."'1 The FCC required the
BOCs to enter into sales agreements with independent CPE vendors to
allow them the equal opportunity to earn commissions on the sale of
CPE as the BOCs' own subsidiaries.182 The FCC ordered this arrange-
ment to reduce the likelihood that the BOCs would engage in cross subsi-
dization by shifting the costs of CPE commissions to regulated
services.'8 3 In addition, the FCC "preempted the states from imposing
structural separation requirements, or any other regulations inconsistent
with the FCC's nonstructural safeguards on the BOCs' marketing of
CPE."ls14
In Sales Agency, Ameritech protested the FCC's decision to condi-
tion the lifting of structural separations requirements from the BOCs on
the continuation of sales agency agreements with independent CPE ven-
dors. 8 ' Ameritech argued that the FCC had no authority "to regulate
the marketing of ... purely intrastate services," contesting the FCC's
authority to preempt state regulation in this area.8 6 The court upheld
the FCC's preemptive order by applying the rules developed by the D.C.
Circuit in Inside Wiring. 187 Ameritech asserted that the FCC was regu-
lating "purely 'intrastate' services such as Centrex."'' 8 Ameritech ar-
gued that the BOCs would incur additional costs "in connection with the
sale of ... Centrex [s]ervices" under the sales agency requirements for
CPE.I 9 The court found that Centrex service is not separable into inter-
state and intrastate components "so as to permit separate state and fed-
eral regulation of the manner in which these services are marketed jointly
with CPE."'1' Following Louisiana Public Service, the court held that
where it is impossible to separate these components, "federal regulation
of the entire subject matter (which may include preemption of inconsis-
tent state regulation) [is allowable] if necessary to fulfill a valid federal
regulatory objective." ''
In this decision, the court applied the principles of Louisiana Public
Service more closely than it had in Inside Wiring by deciding the preemp-
tion issue under the inseparability exception in footnote four of Louisiana
181. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
182. Illinois Bell, 883 F.2d at 107.
183. Id
184. Id. at 108.
185. Id. at 107.
186. Id at 108.
187. Id. at 115-16.
188. Id. at 112. Centrex is central office equipment for businesses that is owned and oper-
ated by the BOCs and located on BOC premises. Centrex is often marketed jointly with CPE.
189. Id
190. Id. at 116.
191. Id. at 115.
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Public Service, rather than determining whether state regulation would
negate FCC policy. The court stated that "strict separation of state and
federal regulatory spheres ... would require construction of wholly in-
dependent intrastate and interstate networks and facilities."
' 192
5. Public Utility Commission of Texas v. FCC-ARCO
The third FCC preemption case that was decided by the D.C. Cir-
cuit in 1989 was Public Utility Commission of Texas v. FCC, 9 3
("ARCO") which involved-a dispute between the Public Utility Commis-
sion of Texas (Texas PUC) and the FCC over a decision by the Atlantic
Richfield Company (ARCO) to disconnect service provided by GTE
Southwest and reconnect service with Southwestern Bell.194 ARCO op-
erates its own private microwave communications network, which con-
nects its offices around the United States. However, ARCO must often
obtain connecting trunk line service from local monopoly service provid-
ers to connect its local offices to its private network. In this case, ARCO
had leased trunk lines from GTE to provide service from its Plano, Texas
laboratory to its private network, and similar lines from Southwestern
Bell to connect its Dallas private branch exchange (PBX) to its private
network.' 95 When ARCO became dissatisfied with GTE's service,
ARCO found it could use its private network to transmit calls from its
Plano laboratory to locations outside of Plano, by first transmitting to its
Dallas PBX and then through Southwestern Bell.196 GTE contested this
action before the Texas PUC, asserting that Southwestern Bell violated a
state law prohibiting provision of service by an uncertified utility in an
area served by another utility.'97 The Texas PUC prohibited the ar-
rangement between ARCO and Southwestern Bell, finding that the inter-
connection would result in "significant public detriment."' 98 Upon
petition by ARCO, the FCC declared the Texas PUC's action invalid. 99
The D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC's preemption order because the
Texas PUC interfered with ARCO's federal right to interconnect with
the public interstate network.2 "o Specifically, the court found the FCC's
analysis reasonable, in that, because the trunk lines in question could
192. Id. at 116.
193. 886 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (this case is commonly referred to as ARCO).
194. Id. at 1327-28.
195. Id. at 1328. GTE is certified by the state as the monopoly provider for the area sur-
rounding Piano, whereas Southwestern Bell is the monopoly provider for the Dallas area.
196. Id.
197. Id at 1328-29.
198. Id at 1329.
199. Id.
200. Id at 1330.
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transmit both interstate and intrastate calls, it was impractical to sepa-
rate the activity.201
It is not clear why the court relied on a lesser standard of insepara-
bility than the Louisiana Public Service impossibility standard. Relying
on its analyses in Inside Wiring and Sales Agency, the court held that
"even when the equipment that the FCC wishes to regulate is used in-
separably and interchangeably for intrastate and interstate calling, the
FCC must limit its regulation to the interstate aspects if it can do so. ''2°2
Finding that the FCC had sufficiently narrowed its preemption order to
limit only state activity that would negate federal policy, the court up-
held the FCC's action.20 3 Apparently significant to the court's decision
is the fact that ARCO sought interconnection with Southwestern Bell for
calls placed outside of GTE's franchised area, yet retained GTE service
within Plano.2' 4
Texas Public Utility suggests that states may "protect ratepayers"
from similar bypass actions "by imposing reasonable charges for termi-
nation of service to minimize the impact of stranded investment."2 "5
Texas Public Utility has been viewed as allowing greater competition in
the local exchange market, which has traditionally been a monopoly ser-
vice. 206 Texas Public Utility relies heavily on Inside Wiring and Sales
Agency in limiting the FCC's preemptive power by requiring the FCC to
demonstrate to the courts that preemption is necessary to achieve its pol-
icy goals under the Communications Act. However, Texas Public Utility
may be limited to its facts because it primarily concerns bypass of the
local exchange and, therefore, is not likely to be used as precedent in
FCC preemption analysis.
D. Impossibility and Inseparability-The Rule
The federal courts of appeals have restricted the FCC's preemptive
power following the Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana Public Ser-
vice, but not enough to slow the FCC's campaign to deregulate the tele-
communications industry. The decisions in the above cases reveal that
the courts are willing to give great deference to the FCC's policies despite
the Supreme Court's admonition that in performing preemption analysis,
courts must look to the statutory basis and congressional intent rather
than to whether the FCC's policies are being negated. The rule resulting
201. Id. at 1333-34.
202. Id
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1335.
205. Id
206. Haring & Levitz, supra note 99, at 320.
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from these cases is that the FCC may preempt state action where it is not
possible to separate the subject matter into distinct intrastate and inter-
state components and where, due to inseparability, state action may ne-
gate the federal policy of competition.
III
California v. FCC
In California v. FCC,"o petitioners, the CPUC, the Michigan Public
Service Commission (MPSC), the New York Public Service Commission
(NYPSC), a number of other state regulators, MCI Telecommunications
Corp. (MCI), and NARUC, sued the FCC in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The petitioners contested the Computer III Order and the
FCC's decision to preempt the states from (a) regulating intrastate and
local enhanced services, and (b) imposing structural separations or non-
structural safeguards that are inconsistent with the safeguards adopted
by the FCC. Several intervenors, including AT&T, IBM, and the BOCs,
filed briefs in support of the FCC. While petitioner MCI claimed that
the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving nonstructural
safeguards in its Computer III Order, petitioners CPUC, MPSC, and
NYPSC argued that the FCC had no authority under the Communica-
tions Act to preempt the states from regulating intrastate enhanced serv-
ices or adopting structural safeguards or inconsistent nonstructural
safeguards. 20 8
The Ninth Circuit issued its decision on June 6, 1990 and found for
the petitioners on all grounds.2°9 A majority of the court held that the
FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously under section 10(e) of the federal
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A) by adopting non-
structural safeguards in the Computer III Order.21 0 More importantly, a
unanimous court held that the clear language of the Communications
Act precludes the FCC from preempting the states from regulating intra-
state enhanced services or requiring structural safeguards or nonstruc-
tural safeguards. that are inconsistent with FCC policies.2 1 While the
bulk of the decision addresses the court's analysis of the FCC's arbitrary
and capricious actions, this Note focuses on the court's analysis of, and
207. 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
208. See generally Supplemental Brief of Petitioners, MCI Telecommunications Corp., Cal-
ifornia v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 87-7230 and consolidated cases).
209. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1246 (9th Cir. 1990).
210. Id. at 1238. The court found that "the record yields no support for the Commission's
position that market and technological changes... have reduced the danger of cross-subsidiza-
tion by the BOCs." Id.
211. Id. at 1240, 1242-45.
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decision on, the preemption issues. The arguments of the petitioners and
the FCC are presented below, followed by the court's decision.
A. The Parties' Arguments
The petitioners raised two preemption issues in California v. FCC:
.(1) whether the FCC has the authority to preempt state regulation of
intrastate and local enhanced services and (2) whether the FCC has the
authority to preempt state regulations imposing structural separation or
nonstructural safeguards, which are inconsistent with, or more stringent
than, the FCC's safeguards.212 However, the FCC phrased the first issue
very differently. 13 The FCC simply asked whether it had the authority
to preempt state regulation of enhanced services without distinguishing
between intrastate and interstate enhanced services.
214
1. FCC Preemption of Intrastate Enhanced Services
In addressing the first preemption issue, the FCC argued that sec-
tion 152(b) does not bar it from preempting state regulation of enhanced
services. The FCC asserted that "[e]nhanced services, by settled defini-
tion, are not common carrier services."21 5 Arguing that section 152(b)
only denies the FCC jurisdiction over intrastate common carrier services,
the FCC concluded that section 152(b) does not prevent it from preempt-
ing state regulation of enhanced services. The FCC asserted that the lan-
guage of section 152(b) ("nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
... give the [FCC] jurisdiction with respect to... intrastate communica-
tion service ... of any carrier") indicated that Congress intended to limit
212. Joint Opening Brief of Petitioners, The People of the State of Cal. & the Pub. Utils.
Comm'n of the State of Cal. at 1, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 87-
7230 and consolidated cases); Joint Reply Brief of Petitioners, the People of the State of Cal. &
the Pub. Utils. Comm'n of the State of Cal. at 11, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.
1990) (No. 87-7230 and consolidated cases).
213. In addition to addressing the preemption arguments, the FCC asserted a resjudicata
defense to the petitioners' claims. The FCC asserted that the D.C. Circuit determined in Com-
puter & Comm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC that the FCC may preempt state regulation of enhanced
services. Brief for FCC at 43, 45-52, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) (No.
87-7230 and consolidated cases). The court rejected the FCC's argument, asserting that the
petitioners in Computer & Comm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC did not have a "'full and fair opportu-
nity' to litigate the claim" of preemption. 905 F.2d at 1245 (citing Kremer v. Chemical Con-
str. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82 n.22 (1982)).
214. Brief for FCC at 43, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 87-7230
and consolidated cases).
215. Id. at 54. The FCC relied on the D.C. Circuit's approval in Computer & Comm
Indus. Ass'n v. FCC that enhanced services were not common carrier services subject to Title
II regulation. Id. at 54-55.
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state jurisdiction to intrastate common carrier services.2" 6 The FCC bol-
stered this argument by claiming that the language in section 152(b) par-
allels language in Title II of the Communications Act, which grants the
FCC specific authority to regulate common carrier services.2" 7 Finally,
the FCC asserted that it had jurisdiction over enhanced services under
"ancillary jurisdiction,"2 ' which allows the FCC to regulate those mat-
ters "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commis-
sion's various responsibilities."2 9
The petitioners argued that section 152(b) was a bar to FCC pre-
emption of intrastate enhanced services. First, the petitioners argued
that section 152(b) does not limit state jurisdiction to common carrier
services.220 The petitioners claimed that, after Louisiana Public Service,
states were guaranteed jurisdiction under section 152(b) over intrastate
communication services provided by telephone companies, including
services "for or in connection with" intrastate service.221 Second, the
petitioners disputed the FCC's claim that similar language in Title II of
the Communications Act showed that Congress intended to limit state
regulation to common carrier activities. The petitioners asserted that
section 152(b) denies the FCC jurisdiction over intrastate services, while
Title II sets forth the FCC's specific regulatory powers over interstate
services. 22  The petitioners asserted that "[a]doption of the FCC's con-
struction of this section would reduce [the] language [of section 152(b)]
to mere surplusage.
' '223
The petitioners also disputed the FCC's assertion that a common
carrier that provides enhanced services is no longer a common carrier.2 2 '
The petitioners argued that common carriers were "subject to state regu-
lation, even if they offered intrastate non-common carrier services."225
Finally, the petitioners argued that the FCC "has failed to demonstrate
216. Id. at 57; Supplemental Brief of FCC at 7-8, 10-14, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217
(9th Cir. 1990) (No. 87-7230 and consolidated cases); 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1988) (emphasis
added).
217. Brief for FCC at 62-63, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 87-
7230 and consolidated cases); Supplemental Brief of FCC at 7-9, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d
1217 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 87-7230 and consolidated cases).
218. See Brief for FCC at 73-77, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 87-
7230 and consolidated cases).
219. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968); see supra notes
103-05 and accompanying text.
220. Joint Opening Brief of Petitioners at 12-25, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.
1990) (No. 87-7230 and consolidated cases).
221:' Id. at, 17.
222. Id. at 16-17.
223. Id. at 17-18.
224. Id at 18.
225. Id at 21.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 13:233
REGULATING INTRASTATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
that the regulation of carrier-provided intrastate enhanced services is rea-
sonably ancillary to its regulation of carrier-provided interstate regulated
services under Title II." '226 The petitioners argued that Title II and sec-
tion 151 do not provide a sufficient statutory basis to give the FCC ancil-
lary jurisdiction over intrastate regulation of enhanced services.227
2. FCC Preemption of State Structural and Nonstructural Safeguards
The FCC argued that, even if the court found that section 152(b)
applied to noncommon carrier services, such as enhanced services, it had
the authority to preempt structural separations imposed by the states and
nonstructural safeguards that were inconsistent with the FCC's safe-
guards.22 The FCC asserted that under Louisiana Public Service it
could preempt state action where it was not possible to separate the sub-
ject matter into intrastate and interstate components.229 The FCC be-
lieved that it would be practically impossible to separate interstate
enhanced services from intrastate services without requiring carriers to
duplicate their equipment at great cost and inefficiency. 23 The FCC as-
serted that any inconsistent state practices would negate the effect of fed-
eral nonstructural safeguards and frustrate the federal policy of
competition in the enhanced services market.23'
The petitioners contended that section 152(b) prohibits the FCC
from regulating intrastate "practices," "facilities," and "regulations,"
and that the FCC may not preempt the states from imposing structural
separations or inconsistent nonstructural safeguards on those who pro-
vide purely intrastate and local enhanced services.232 The petitioners
also contested the FCC's claim that separation of interstate and intra-
state enhanced services would be so impracticable as to be impossible. In
contrast to the FCC, petitioners fully explained this argument, supplying
a complete description of how interstate and intrastate enhanced services
could be provided under federal structural safeguards and state struc-
tural safeguards, respectively.233 The petitioners refuted the FCC and
BOCs' argument that inconsistent state safeguards would interfere with
226. Id. at 27.
227. Id. at 27-30.
228. Brief for FCC at 85, 88, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 87-
7230 and consolidated cases).
229. Id. at 78.
230. Id. at 79.
231. Id. at 83.
232. Joint Opening Brief of Petitioners at 37, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.
1990) (No. 87-7230 and consolidated cases).
233. Id. at 41-44, addendum B; Supplemental Brief of Petitioners, MCI Telecommunica-
tions Corp. at 22-24, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 87-7230 and
consolidated cases).
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the federal goal of an integrated and competitive enhanced services mar-
ket, stating that the petitioners were concerned with regulation of intra-
state and local enhanced services, not with regulation of the interstate
enhanced services market over which the FCC has jurisdiction.234
B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision
The Ninth Circuit found for the petitioners on all grounds.235 A
majority of the court (Judges Norris and Farris) found for petitioners
MCI and NYPSC on the claim that the FCC acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously under the Administrative Procedure Act in approving the Com-
puter III Order. 236 Judge Boochever joined Judges Norris and Farris in a
unanimous decision denying the FCC the preemptive power to prohibit
state regulation of intrastate enhanced services and state imposition of
structural safeguards or inconsistent nonstructural safeguards.237
1. FCC Preemption of Intrastate Enhanced Services
The court phrased the first issue as whether section 152(b)(1) of the
Communications Act, which denies the FCC jurisdiction with respect to
" 'charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for
or in connection with intrastate communication service by wire or radio
of any carrier,'... distinguishes between basic and enhanced telecommu-
nications services."23 The court simply read section 152(b) to include
enhanced services: "the broad language of [section 152(b)(1)] makes clear
that the sphere of state authority which the statute 'fences off from FCC
reach or regulation,' . . . includes, at a minimum, services that are deliv-
ered by a telephone carrier 'in connection with' its intrastate common
carrier telephone services. 
' 239
The court rejected the FCC's argument that section 152(b) does not
apply to enhanced services because the section does not apply to non-
common carrier services and enhanced services are noncommon carrier
services.2' The court further stated that the language "of any carrier"
means that the statute distinguishes "between providers of communica-
234. Joint Opening Brief of Petitioners at 47, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.
1990) (No. 87-7230 and consolidated cases); Supplemental Brief of Petitioners at 25-28, Cali-
fornia v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 87-7230 and consolidated cases).
235. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1246 (9th Cir. 1990).
236. Id. at 1238, 1246.
237. Id. at 1242-46.
238. Id. at 1239 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)(1) (Supp. V 1982)).
239. Id. at 1240 (quoting Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 370 (1986)).
240. Id. ("That these enhanced services are not themselves provided on a common carrier
basis is beside the point. As long as enhanced services are provided by communications car-
ers over the intrastate telephone network, the broad 'in connection with' language of
[§ 152(b)(1)] places them squarely within the regulatory domain of the states.").
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tions services, i.e., between carriers and non-carriers." '241 The court fol-
lowed the D.C. Circuit's Inside Wiring decision, which rejected the
FCC's attempt to preempt state regulation of intrastate inside wiring.242
The FCC had characterized inside wiring as a noncommon carrier ser-
vice, and thus not subject to section 152(b). The D.C. Circuit criticized
the FCC for attempting "to rewrite" the Communications Act.243
The Ninth Circuit was not required to follow the D.C. Circuit's de-
cision. It could have developed its own tests and standards. However,
had the court accepted the FCC's arguments, it would have shifted all
regulatory authority over enhanced services to the FCC. Such a decision
would remove a layer of protection for consumers by shifting regulatory
accountability from a body more able to address local and universal ser-
vice concerns to a remote, overworked agency. The court's interpreta-
tion of section 152(b) presents a strong message to the FCC that it does
not have exclusive authority over telecommunications policy.
2. Inseparability of State and Federal Regulations
Regardless of how the court decided the common carrier issue, it
was also necessary to determine whether the FCC could preempt the
states from adopting structural separations or nonstructural safeguards
that differed from those adopted by the FCC. The impossibility excep-
tion to section 152(b), set forth in footnote four of Louisiana Public Ser-
vice, is the key to this preemption question. In Louisiana Public Service,
the Supreme Court adopted part of the North Carolina Utilities exception
to section 152(b), acknowledging that where it is impossible "to separate
the interstate and the intrastate components of the asserted FCC regula-
tion," the FCC may preempt state regulation. 2 "
The Ninth Circuit recognized the impossibility exception to section
152(b) but held that the exception was "a limited one."' 245 The court
measured "impossibility" of the coexistence of state and federal regula-
tions by evaluating the extent to which state regulations might frustrate
federal policies. The court again relied on the D.C. Circuit's Inside Wir-
ing decision, adopting the rule that " 'a valid FCC preemption order
must be limited to [state regulation] that would necessarily thwart or im-
pede' the FCC's goals[,]" and that the FCC must show "with some speci-
241. Id. (emphasis in original).
242. Id. at 1242.
243. Id.. (quoting National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422, 428 (D.C.
Cir. 1989)).
244. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375 n.4 (1986).
245. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1243 (9th Cir. 1990).
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ficity that [state regulation] would negate the federal policy. . ... ,
Thus, the court held that the FCC may not preempt all state regulatory
action by showing only that "some of the preempted state regulation
would, if not preempted, frustrate FCC regulatory goals."247 The court
found that the FCC did not sufficiently limit its preemption orders in the
Computer III Order and that the FCC went too far when it sought to
preempt all state structural separation regulations.248 The court noted
that the states could adopt structural separation requirements for
"purely intrastate" activities, such as "alarm services and database serv-
ices for schools," without interfering with FCC regulation of interstate
enhanced services.249 While the FCC asserted that structural separations
would require the separation of all facilities, the court relied on the peti-
tioners' claims that intrastate enhanced services and basic services could
be provided by separate corporations, while using the same equipment.2 °
The court also rejected the FCC's attempt to preempt all state nonstruc-
tural safeguards that are inconsistent with, or more stringent than, those
established by the FCC, finding that the FCC did not fully explain what
goals state regulation would frustrate.251
In this decision, the Ninth Circuit successfully staved off the FCC's
attempts to preempt state regulation of intrastate telecommunications.
However, the impossibility standard applied by the Ninth Circuit consti-
tutes the only weak link in the court's reasoning. While the Inside Wir-
ing test of impossibility limits the ability of the FCC to preempt state
regulation of intrastate telecommunications services, it does not limit the
FCC as fully as Louisiana Public Service would allow. The Ninth Circuit
is not required to follow the D.C. Circuit. The Ninth Circuit could have
decided "impossibility" under its own standard by applying a stricter test
requiring the FCC to prove that state regulations would truly "negate"
FCC regulations, rather than following the D.C. Circuit's lesser standard
that calls for the FCC to show only that state regulation frustrates,
thwarts, or interferes with FCC policy. For now, however, the states
have retained their authority to regulate intrastate telecommunications
under the Communications Act.
246. Id. (quoting National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Commrs, 880 F.2d at 430) (emphasis in 905
F.2d at 1243).
247. Id. at 1243.
248. Id
249. Id at 1244.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1245.
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IV
Recommendations for the Future
Under Louisiana Public Service, courts must look to congressional
.intent in the language of the Communications Act to decide FCC pre-
emption cases. While the Communications Act does not always provide
clear answers for reviewing courts, it is clear that courts must not inter-
pret the Act in a way that will nullify section 152(b). Until Congress
amends the Communications Act, this section remains a valid expression
of Congress's intent to grant the states a role in making telecommunica-
tions policy. ,
Since only Congress can effectively relieve the present tension be-
tween the states and the FCC concerning dual jurisdiction matters, this
Note recommends an amendment to the Communications Act that
would ameliorate jurisdictional disputes, without eliminating section
152(b). Congress should amend the Communications Act to describe
specifically the balance of power between the states and the FCC, espe-
cially as to dual jurisdiction matters.
To address the dual jurisdiction issue realistically, Congress should
amend section 410(c) of the Communications Act to mandate the use of
a Federal-State Joint Board when issues arise over dual jurisdiction prop-
erty and services, and require the states and the FCC to negotiate regula-
tions concerning dual jurisdiction matters within a modified Joint Board
structure. As section 410 is currently drafted,252 the FCC has the dis-
cretion to convene several different state advisory committees to assist
the FCC in its policy-making activities. The statute provides for three
different types of advisory committees: State Joint Boards,253 State Com-
missions,2 54 and Federal-State Joint Boards. 2" State Joint Boards are
composed entirely of state commissioners from those states affected by a
particular FCC action.256 State commission conferences are convened to
discuss specific regulations.257 Federal-State Joint Boards, composed of
four state commissioners and three FCC commissioners, make recom-
mendations to the FCC concerning jurisdictional separations.258
The FCC has convened a state-federal Open Network Architecture
Conference to prevent a similar conflict over the development of Open
252. 47 U.S.C. § 410 (1988).
253. Id. § 410(a).
254. Id. § 410(b).
255. Id. § 410(c).
256. Id. § 410(a).
257. Id. § 410(b).
258. Id. § 410(c); see supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
1991]
Network Architecture requirements. 259 However, it is unclear from the
statute what the authority and responsibilities of the Conference are. In
addition, the FCC is under no statutory obligation to participate in Con-
ference meetings, nor is it bound to adopt the decisions or recommenda-
tions adopted by the Conference.
Section 410(c) requires the FCC to create a Joint Board to develop
separations procedures for the allocation of cost between intrastate and
interstate components of dual jurisdiction property. However, the FCC
has the discretion to create Joint Boards for "other matters, relating to
common carrier communications of joint [Federal-State] concern.
''26 °
Congress should remove the FCC's discretion in this area and amend
section 410(c) to require the FCC to convene a Federal-State Joint Board
prior to any FCC rulemaking proceeding involving dual jurisdiction mat-
ters subject to section 152(b).
The House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance held
hearings in March 1990 to discuss a draft bill developed by subcommittee
staff. The draft bill would lift some of the line-of-business restrictions
that the Modified Final Judgment imposed on the BOCs.261 The draft
bill proposes that a Joint Board, composed of an equal number of FCC
commissioners and State commissioners, recommend regulations to lift
Modified Final Judgment restrictions on the offering of information serv-
ices by the BOCs.262 While this proposal is limited to Modified Final
Judgment line-of-business restrictions, it is significant that House mem-
bers consider the Joint Board process a meaningful way to develop FCC
regulations.263
In addition, section 4 10(c) should be amended to require the FCC to
develop regulations concerning dual regulation matters through a Joint
Board using the negotiated rulemaking process. Under this process, an
unspecified number of the Joint Board appointees would negotiate the
259. In re Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 111, paras. 216-19 (1989); Haring & Levitz, supra note 99, at 319
n.152. The Open Network Architecture Joint Conference has met twice already. See FCC
Announces First Meeting of the ONA Joint Conference, Public Notice, 4 FCC Rcd. 5793
(1989); FCC Announces Second Meeting of the ONA Joint Conference, Public Notice, 4 FCC
Rcd. 8220 (1989).
260. 47 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988).
261. Telephone interview with Kevin Joseph, Staff Assistant, House Subcomm. on Tele-
communications and Finance (Feb. 28, 1990); STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT, TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS POLICY ACT OF 1990, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter DRAFT BILL]; see also
Killette, Free-the-Bells Bill Released, COMMUNICATIONS WEEK, Feb. 12, 1990, at 8.
262. DRAFT BILL, supra note 261, § 257(d), at 44. Interestingly, the draft bill recommends
that the BOCs offer such services only through separate subsidiaries. Id. § 254.
263. Although the draft bill was never introduced in the 101st Congress, Committee staff
will actively pursue the Bill in the 102d Congress. Telephone interview with Colin Cromwell,
Staff Assistant, House Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance (Oct. 24, 1990).
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dual jurisdiction issue and draft a proposed rule, which would then fol-
low the traditional requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act for
notice and comment rulemaking.2" "Negotiated rulemaking" is a pro-
cess that the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
recommended in 1985 for agency use to resolve disputes between agen-
cies and parties affected by regulations before a rule is developed, instead
of resolving their differences in the courts after the rule is issued.2 6
In negotiated rulemaking, the agency publishes a notice in the Fed-
eral Register announcing that it will conduct a negotiated rulemaking
process. 2 " The agency chooses a neutral "convenor" to organize the ne-
gotiation and work with the agency in deciding who will participate.267
The agency may also appoint a mediator to lead the negotiations.268
Whether or not a "negotiating group" arrives at a consensus on a pro-
posed rule, the group prepares a report for the agency including the draft
rules, or the areas of dispute.269 The agency then publishes the negoti-
ated proposed rule in the Federal Register and follows traditional notice
and comment rulemaking procedures.27° If the agency does not use the
negotiated proposed rule, it must publish an explanation of its decision in
the Federal Register. 
271
The ACUS Recommendation outlines several "factors" that should
lead to better negotiations. These factors include that (1) issues be "ripe
for decision, ' 272 (2) participants not be required to compromise their
fundamental beliefs,273 (3) the number of participants be limited to no
more than fifteen,274 (4) a reasonable deadline for agreement be set,27 5 (5)
no one party "dominate the negotiations, ' 276 (6) participants be willing
to negotiate and "view it as in their interest to use the process as opposed
264. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
265. Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) Recommendation No. 82-4,
1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1989). ACUS Recommendation No. 85-5 adopted the term "negotiated
rulemaking." See 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 n.1 (1989).
266. 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4, Recommendations 1, 7 (1989); Harter, Dispute Resolution and
Administrative Law: The History, Needs, and Future of a Complex Relationship, 29 VILL. L.
Rav. 1393, 1406 (1983-84).
267. 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4, Recommendation 3 (1989).
268. Id. § 305.85-5, Recommendations 5, 10.
269. Id. § 305.82-4, Recommendation 11.
270. Id. Recommendation 13; Harter, supra note 266, at 1407.
271. 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4, Recommendation 13 (1989).
272. Id. Recommendation 4(a).
273. Id. Recommendation 4(b).
274. Id. Recommendation 4(c).
275. Id. Recommendation 4(a).
276. Id. Recommendation 4(e).
1991]
to the traditional one,"277 and, finally, (7) the agency be willing to
negotiate.2
Negotiated rulemaking has been used by the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), and twice by the Environmental Protection Agency.2 79 While
three of these negotiations were successful, the fourth, a negotiation by
OSHA to establish a standard for occupational exposure to benzene, was
not.2 ° In addition, Congress recently enacted legislation that adopted a
negotiated rulemaking procedure as a demonstration project to develop
Department of Education regulations for elementary and secondary
school programs. 28' However, Congress gave the Department of Educa-
tion the authority to "select the participants" and to decide which regu-
lations will be developed under the negotiated rulemaking procedure.28 2
Thus, the Department of Education has more power under this legisla-
tion to set the rules and choose the players than in the negotiated
rulemaking scheme developed by the ACUS.
The history of the Computer Inquiries shows that any rulemaking
by the FCC concerning dual jurisdiction matters will be contested and
reviewed in federal court, especially if the rule preempts state action.
Negotiated rulemaking may provide the FCC, industry representatives,
and state regulators with a means to hammer out their differences before
they get to court. However, given the entrenched positions of the parties,
several of the factors discussed above must be present for any negotiation
in this area to be effective. First, the FCC and the states must be willing
to negotiate. The parties will be more likely to seek a negotiated
rulemaking if the outcome of the negotiation promises to be better than
what they would achieve through the traditional court-contested
rulemaking. Second, while the FCC has the upper hand in the tradi-
tional rulemaking process, it must not dominate a negotiated rulemaking.
It is not clear whether negotiated rulemaking of dual jurisdiction
issues will be effective in reducing reliance on the courts to resolve dis-
putes between the states and the FCC. However, combining the
mandatory negotiation of dual jurisdiction issues with the Joint Board
process will, at the least, give the states a greater role in setting telecom-
munications policy. Even if the parties cannot reach an agreement, the
277. Id. Recommendation 4(f); Harter, supra note 266, at 1406.
278. 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4, Recommendation 4(g) (1989).
279. 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1989); see Perritt, Analysis of Four Negotiated Rulemaking Ef-
forts, 1985 A.C.U.S. 637 (1985).
280. 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1989).
281. Augustus F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Im-
provement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-297, 102 Stat. 424 (1988).
282. Id. at 119.
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process would be an improvement over the status quo since the states
would be involved in the rulemaking process from the beginning, rather
than having to respond to the FCC's final decisions. At best, negotiated
rulemaking may result in a rule that will satisfy all parties and reduce




While the FCC's policy goal of attaining a competitive telecommu-
nications market is compelling, upholding the FCC's preemption orders
in the Computer III Order would have nullified the dual regulatory
scheme of section 152 of the Communications Act. Despite the Supreme
Court's admonishment in Louisiana Public Service that courts must look
to Congressional intent and not to the FCC's policy goals when engaged
in preemption analysis, the federal courts of appeals have continued to
defer to the FCC's policy decisions. Such decisions have diminished the
effectiveness of section 152(b) in maintaining a role for the states in tele-
communications regulation. The Ninth Circuit's decision in California v.
FCC forces the FCC to acknowledge that the states are partners in the
development of telecommunications policy.
The Ninth Circuit followed the lead of the D.C. Circuit in Inside
Wiring and limited the FCC's preemptive power by requiring the FCC to
prove that state structural separation requirements and nonstructural
safeguards for intrastate and local enhanced services negate valid federal
policy in order to preempt state regulation. A more deferential decision
would have effectively eliminated section 152(b) from the Communica-
tions Act. Under Louisiana Public Service, only Congress may amend
the Communications Act. Congress should amend the Communications
Act to relieve the courts of the responsibility of deciding issues of dual
jurisdiction. Such an amendment would provide the states with a more
meaningful role in the rulemaking process.
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